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In this thesis, we examine the process of how new information is impounded into the
market, more commonly known as the price discovery process. We used GIS by Lien &
Shrestha (2014) and identified the most relevant and important markets in bitcoin’s price
discovery process. We analyzed the GIS within various markets using minute-by-minute
market close data from 21 different bitcoin pairs from June 1, 2020, until April 30, 2021.
First, we analyzed the GIS in the spot market. The results suggest that Binance’s
stablecoin denominated pair leads the spot market, with Coinbase in a close second.
Second, we analyzed the GIS in the unregulated futures market. Our results indicate that
Huobi and OKEx futures lead the unregulated futures market. Third, we analyzed the
GIS in the perpetual swaps market. We found indications that Binance’s linear perpetual
swap is the leading instrument in the perpetual swap market.
We then analyzed the leaders from each group, in addition to CME bitcoin futures. The
results from this analysis suggest that the unregulated futures on Huobi and OKEx tend
to lead the market. However, we observed trends of substantial price discovery taking
place on both the CME futures and the Binance perpetual swap contract. We identified a
more pronounced leading role of the CME bitcoin futures than found in previous literature
following the same methodology, suggesting that the regulated futures market has become
an important part of bitcoin’s price discovery.
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1 Introduction
In 2008, the pseudonymous creator Satoshi Nakamoto published a white paper establishing
Bitcoin as the first digital currency to operate through a peer-to-peer network without
a central authority (Nakamoto, 2008). Since the Bitcoin genesis block of January 3rd,
2009, the bitcoin trading ecosystem has evolved organically through the emergence of spot
markets, decentralized exchanges, and unregulated and regulated derivatives markets.
However, bitcoin’s value, necessity, and underlying technology have been heavily debated
topics in the last 12 years. Despite its critics, bitcoin has seen a sharp appreciation in
value, reaching a market capitalization above $1 trillion (coinmarketcap.com, n.d.). Thus,
bitcoin is an asset that should be studied rigorously by economists seeking to understand
this emerging asset from technical, financial, philosophical, and theoretical perspectives.
This thesis aims to provide a better understanding of the bitcoin market. This investigation
identifies the most important exchanges and investigates whether the involvement of
regulated markets has impacted the price discovery of bitcoin.
1.1 Motivation
In December of 2017, bitcoin’s value soared after a yearlong bull market. It reached a
peak of over $19,000 per coin, a value that long held the record of being the all-time high,
until December of 2020.
Around the time of bitcoin’s 2017 peak, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) introduced financially settled futures contracts
on bitcoin. Previous price discovery research papers have credited the launch of the futures
contracts by CME and CBOE as a key factor in the massive price decline of bitcoin in the
following months. More specifically, the inception of an organized, transparent derivatives
market for institutional investors enabled traders to more easily short bitcoin (Baur &
Dimpfl, 2019; Sebastião & Godinho, 2020; Fassas et al., 2020).
However, the daily volumes from CME and CBOE were substantially lower than those of
other unregulated exchanges, and CBOE eventually announced its withdrawal in March
2019 (Hill, 2019).
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Although the regulated exchanges entered the market in 2017, the unregulated exchanges
had been operating since 2011 (Bragin, 2015). Thus, it may seem odd that so few have
researched the role of unregulated derivatives exchanges in bitcoin despite their significant
trading volume.
Furthermore, unregulated derivatives exchanges such as Binance, BitMEX, Bybit, Deribit,
FTX, Kraken, OKEx, and Huobi all have substantial trading volumes and open interest
in bitcoin futures, perpetual swaps (perpetuals), and options. In this paper, the term
"unregulated" is used because many of these exchanges are based in countries with little
or no regulation of derivatives trading. Additionally, unregulated exchanges’ possible price
discovery role has been overlooked in many of the previous price discovery articles on
bitcoin. In fact, it has been researched only by Alexander et al. (2020) and Alexander
& Heck (2020). These articles revealed significant price discoveries at the unregulated
exchanges, where both the perpetuals and futures contracts have important roles.
Based on the findings in these papers, the authors concluded that bitcoin was not ready
for mainstream trading products such as exchange-traded funds (ETF). That is, the risk
of market manipulation was too high. However, since the release of these two research
papers, there have been momentous developments within the bitcoin market.
From the beginning of April 2019 until January 2020, the time period of the data used by
Alexander & Heck (2020), BitMEX was the largest exchange for futures and perpetuals
by average daily volume (ADV). In 2020, CME’s bitcoin futures substantially increased
their trading volume. By the end of November 2020, CME’s bitcoin futures had a larger
open interest than any unregulated exchange (Arcane Research, 2020).
Furthermore, in 2020, BitMEX faced legal issues due to a lack of proper know-your-
customer (KYC) implementation on the platform. Thus, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) charged BitMEX for illegally operating a cryptocurrency derivatives
trading platform and anti-money laundering violations. Additionally, the U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ) charged the founders of BitMEX with violations of the Bank Secrecy Act
(Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, 2020). BitMEX’s open interest declined
following these charges, while other unregulated platforms such as Binance and Bybit
grew in size, changing the market structure.
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Given the changes in the futures market over the last year, it would be valuable to
re-examine the previous studies on price discovery, with unregulated exchanges included,
to better understand the current state of the market. Furthermore, understanding the
roles of and the relationship between the regulated and unregulated derivatives markets
in bitcoin is also important for regulatory authorities.
In recent years, there have been several attempts to create bitcoin ETFs in the United
States. However, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has declined all
ETF applications thus far, mainly because of the underlying bitcoin market and the risks
of market manipulation (Bambrough, 2020a).
The lack of a proper bitcoin ETF in the U.S. has created unfortunate market inefficiencies,
impacting retail investors. As of this writing, there exist certain instruments through
which U.S. investors can gain bitcoin exposure through their 401-Ks. The most notable
instrument is the Grayscale Bitcoin Trust, in which accredited investors may invest directly
in Grayscale either in cash or in-kind using bitcoin. This fund currently holds more than
600,000 bitcoin (Stevens & Copeland, 2021). Retail investors are eligible to invest in the
Grayscale Bitcoin Trust only through shares in the secondary market. Due to the lack of
an active redemption program and a six-month lock-up period, the shares in the secondary
market frequently trade at a significant premium or discount from the net asset value.
Thus, this fund is suboptimal for investors seeking bitcoin exposure (Lunde, 2020).
With bitcoin’s strong performance in 2020 and 2021, many new ETF applications have
been issued. Currently, there are ten active bitcoin ETF applications issued by entities
such as VanEck, Fidelity, Skybridge, NYDIG, and Galaxy Digital (Napach, 2021; De,
2021). This thesis aims to shed light on the current role of the regulated futures market
in bitcoin, helping the SEC assess the current risk of market manipulation.
Therefore, this paper proposes the following research question:
How relevant is the regulated market in the price discovery process?
This question will be answered with data gathered from coinAPI and Bloomberg for 21
different price pairs, consisting of spot pairs and various derivative instruments between
May 2020 and April 2021.
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2 Background and theory
This section encompasses relevant theories and background information for this thesis. It
presents Bitcoin and how its trading ecosystem evolved to its current state. The section
further introduce stablecoins, the derivatives used in the analysis, and the markets in
which they trade.
2.1 Bitcoin
Bitcoin is an invention based on decades of research developed to build a digital,
decentralized currency. The Bitcoin whitepaper itself is heavily influenced by the ideas
presented in Wei Dai’s B-Money (1998) and Adam Back’s Hashcash (2002). Behind
the innovation of Bitcoin was the fundamental idea of allowing value to be transacted
from one entity to another without the need for a trusted intermediary. This feature of
Bitcoin was enabled by the use of cryptographic proof of work instead of trust (Nakamoto,
2008). When transactions in Bitcoin are conducted, they are timestamped and compiled
into a new block every 10 minutes. Each block is then transferred to the network for
confirmations and secured by the proof of work which is completed by miners solving
hashing algorithms related to the block. Additionally, each block carries a cryptographic
hash from the previous block, meaning that each new block contains information from
the previous block. In turn, this process creates a chain of blocks filled with transactions,
creating a tamper-proof distributed ledger, popularly called a blockchain. This thesis will
refer to the blockchain as “Bitcoin” using a capital letter "B", and the cryptocurrency as
“bitcoin”, with a lowercase "b".
The miner solving the hash for the upcoming block is rewarded with bitcoin. In addition
to transaction fees, this reward is the mechanism that incentivizes miners to commit
computational power to the Bitcoin network. The block reward (or miner subsidy) is
fixed, but it halves every 210,000 blocks, approximately every fourth-year (Nakamoto,
2008). The current block reward sits at 6.25 bitcoin per block, with a current inflation rate
per annum at 1.77%. Bitcoin has an absolute scarcity because there will only ever be 21
million bitcoins in existence. As of now, more than 18.7 million bitcoins are in circulation,
meaning that 89.15% of the supply has already been issued (bitcoinblockhalf.com, n.d.).
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Bitcoin is transferable at any time, 365 days a year, with no need for an intermediary. It is
completely permissionless, meaning that anyone can transfer value on the Bitcoin network
whenever and to whomever they desire, with full finality (Arcane Research, 2021a). These
features enable bitcoin to function well as a collateral asset, enable financial innovation,
and continuous trading on exchanges. That is, bitcoin can be traded globally at any time,
on both the spot markets and in the bitcoin-collateralized futures market.
2.1.1 Bitcoin trading ecosystem
The bitcoin market is complicated, with many entities serving various roles within the
market. This environment involves many spot exchanges, a large unregulated derivatives
market, and a growing regulated derivatives market. From an outside perspective, the
bitcoin trading ecosystem may be difficult to understand.
Therefore, the following pages provide a brief recap of bitcoin’s history, giving the reader
sufficient background information to understand how the bitcoin trading ecosystem reached
its current state. The paper details this enlightenment process by describing Bitcoin’s
12-year old history. In the process, this study defines four major cycles that have shaped
the market into its current state.
During Bitcoin’s first market cycle from 2010 to 2011, Bitcoin gained attention due to
its permissionless transfers. The first known purchase of a physical good paid with bitcoin
was conducted on May 22 2010 when Laszlo Hanyecz purchased two pizzas for 10,000
BTC (laszlo, 2010).
In 2010, Wikileaks transfers were blocked by Visa, MasterCard (Greenberg, 2010), and
PayPal (WikiLeaks, 2010). Early Bitcoin activists reached out to Wikileaks to convince
them to accept bitcoin payments (Matonis, 2012). However, Satoshi Nakamoto was
unhappy with Bitcoin being involved in Wikileaks and commented as follows:
"It would have been nice to get this attention in any other context. WikiLeaks
has kicked the hornet’s nest, and the swarm is headed towards us." (Nakamoto,
2010)
Satoshi could not stop the activists, despite being the creator of Bitcoin. Wikileaks started
accepting bitcoin payments, and Bitcoin’s properties saw its first major real-world use
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case with activists donating funds to the organization, utilizing the permissionless nature
of the asset. In addition to the Wikileaks donations, Bitcoin’s permissionless transfers
created a thriving black market, most notably on The Silk Road (U.S. Attorney’s Office,
2013).
During this cycle, the majority of the bitcoin trades were conducted from peer-to-peer
markets, but the cycle also involved the first order book exchanges (Sedgwick, 2018).
The second market cycle occurred in 2013. During this second cycle, Bitcoin received its
first major round of public attention. As the attention grew, more advanced infrastructures
were built around trading bitcoin and purchasing goods for bitcoin, with The Silk Road
and Mt. Gox as the dominating platforms. The Silk Road was removed by the FBI in
October 2013 because, among other things, it facilitated the buying and selling of drugs
(U.S. Attorney’s Office, 2013). A couple of months later, Mt. Gox, the largest crypto
exchange at the time, which at that time purported to handle 80% of all bitcoin trade
volume (Spaven, 2013), filed for bankruptcy (Takemoto & Knight, 2014).
Additionally, in December 2013, China banned banks from handling bitcoin trade (BBC
tech, 2013). These events occurred during the most volatile period of bitcoin’s rally
towards and beyond $1000 of late 2013 (coinmarketcap.com, n.d.) and were followed by a
protracted bear market. The Chinese ban led early bitcoin activist Roger Ver to launch
the successful marketing campaign titled Bitcoin: The honey badger of money. The
campaign was a reference to a popular meme at the time depicting how the honey badger
ignores all of the dangers and challenges it meets. This illustration projected that Bitcoin
would thrive even if Chinese or American politicians wanted to ban it (McMillan, 2013).
During the second cycle, new spot exchanges such as Bitstamp, Kraken, Coinbase, and
Gemini emerged. These exchanges have since cooperated with regulators by implementing
KYC and anti-money laundering (AML) procedures while also improving the custody of
user funds on their platforms.
The third market cycle occurred in 2017. At its peak, Bitcoin frequently made headlines
in mainstream news outlets, and public awareness of Bitcoin increased. As the spot
markets matured during the bear market of 2014-2015, market places for bitcoin derivatives
gradually arose. The permissionless nature of Bitcoin made building unregulated derivative
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exchanges possible.
Initially, the unregulated derivative exchanges offered inverse futures for bitcoin (Bragin,
2015). This was a convenient solution for miners seeking to hedge their operations and
also enabled opportunists to gain leveraged exposure to the upside.
On May 13, 2016, the derivative exchange BitMEX launched an innovative derivative
product, the inverse perpetual contract (Hayes, 2016). This derivative product is discussed
in greater detail in section 2.5. Once Bitcoin entered its bull market in 2017, trading in
the perpetuals grew, and during the peak of the bull market, the trade volumes of the
perpetuals overtook those of the spot market (interdax, 2019).
During the third cycle, allocating assets into cryptocurrencies was a simple process for
retail investors, but the trading ecosystem was not optimized for sophisticated, well-
capitalized institutional players. That is, trusted and regulated derivative instruments
did not exist until the peak of the 2017 bull market (Damiani, 2017; CME Group, 2017).
Additionally, the market-making across exchanges was relatively poor, as spreads often
occurred across exchanges and fiat currency pairs (Pongratz, 2021). Thus, the market
was not ready for large-scale institutional adoption.
At the peak of the third cycle, an important step was taken towards a more mature
derivative market in bitcoin. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) launched cash-
settled bitcoin futures (CME Group, 2017), giving institutional investors access to bitcoin
through a regulated marketplace with a trusted intermediary in a familiar system. Bitcoin
soared in value towards the launch of the CME futures, as market participants anticipated
that the entrance of a regulated futures market would lead institutional buyers to the
market. However, on the day of the launch, bitcoin reached its price peak of the cycle.
The expectations were too high, and institutional investors were careful with allocating
funds in bitcoin. Then followed yet another protracted bear market in bitcoin.
Bitcoin is currently in its fourth market cycle. More robust institutional offerings
have emerged, and institutional investors have begun investing in bitcoin utilizing brokers
(Genesis, 2021), institutionally oriented spot markets through LMAX Digital (Abdel-
Qader, 2021), OTC desks (Kaul et al., 2021), futures on CME (Godbole, 2021), and
bitcoin investment vehicles (Grayscale, 2021).
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The institutional adoption of bitcoin accelerated in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis.
This was a reaction to the monetary and fiscal policies initiated globally in response to
the financial instability caused by the virus. In May 2020, Paul Tudor Jones publicly
stated that he had invested in bitcoin as an inflation hedge, comparing it to investing in
gold in the 1970s.
“I also made the case for owning Bitcoin, the quintessence of scarcity premium.
It is literally the only large tradeable asset in the world that has a known fixed
maximum supply.[. . . ] This brilliant feature of Bitcoin was designed by the
anonymous creator of Bitcoin to protect its integrity by making it increasingly
near and dear, a concept alien to the current thinking of central banks and
governments.” (Jones & Giorgianni, 2020)
When Tudor Jones entered this investment space, his action had a snowballing effect.
Stan Druckenmiller (Bambrough, 2020b) later invested in bitcoin, along with major funds
such as RenTech’s Medallion Fund (Wigglesworth & Aliaj, 2020); BlackRock (Stankiewicz,
2021); StoneRidge (del Castillo, 2020); Skybridge (La Monica, 2021); Guggenheim (Greifeld
& Hajric, 2020); Ruffer Investments (Voell, 2020); and college endowments (Allison, 2021).
Additionally, corporations began adding bitcoin to their balance sheet. This occurred with
MicroStrategy first (Reuters, 2021); Square later (Lee, 2021); and then Tesla (Kovach,
2021) in the United States. In Norway, Aker allocated capital to bitcoin through its newly
established daughter company Seetee (AKER, 2021).
The four cycles described above have all contributed to shaping the bitcoin trading
ecosystem as we know it today. First, a gradually maturing spot market evolved with
various large platforms. Next, the unregulated derivative platforms emerged, adding a
new and important layer to bitcoin’s price discovery. After this, the regulated market
matured through both spot markets and derivatives market infrastructure enabling large
investors from traditional financial markets to gain access to the bitcoin markets. Thus,
this ecosystem has evolved organically to its current state.
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2.2 Stablecoins
Stablecoins are bearer monetary assets designed to mimic the price of fiat currencies by
utilizing a stabilization mechanism. They are essentially a digital representation of fiat
currency that lives on blockchains (The Block Research, 2021). These assets combine the
low volatility of sovereign currencies with the settlement assurances of public blockchains,
allowing fiat currency to be transferred and settled anywhere over the internet with less
interference than the traditional banking system would cause (The Block Research, 2021).
The most common stablecoins are USD-collateralized stablecoins with a 1:1 backing. That
is, one unit of these USD collateralized stablecoins is redeemable for one USD. From
January 1, 2020, to January 1, 2021, the number of stablecoins in circulation grew by 400%,
from $6 to $30 billion, with Tether (USDT) being the largest of these stablecoins (The
Block Research, 2021). As of May 16, 2021, there are $58.6 billion USDT in circulation
(Tether, n.d.).
Therefore, stablecoins have become an integral part of the trading ecosystem of
cryptocurrencies. They are now frequently used in all markets, from spot markets
to the unregulated futures market. In the futures market, stablecoins enable unregulated
futures exchanges to create linear futures, in contrast with the inverse futures and quanto
futures. The latter structure was common in futures contracts before stablecoin-settled
futures began to gain traction in 2020 (Arcane Research, 2021b).
2.3 Unregulated derivatives exchanges
Unregulated markets have played a significant role in Bitcoin’s history. In many ways, this
history is unlike the histories of most of the available investment vehicles in recent history.
That is, this trading ecosystem has grown organically through adoption and innovation in
the unregulated markets to reach its current state. Crypto native derivative exchanges
utilizing the permissionless nature of bitcoin arose before bitcoin gained the attention of
regulators and institutions. The subsequent evolution and adoption were first based on
specialized infrastructure, so there is still considerable bitcoin trade volume occurring on
unregulated exchanges (coinmarketcap.com, n.d.).
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The inverse perpetual by BitMEX (Hayes, 2016) became a popular derivative instrument
to trade during the 2017 bull market. However, it was not until the bear market of
2018-19 that the adoption of the derivatives markets accelerated to absorb most of the
trading volume in bitcoin (interdax, 2019). As the market became less volatile, speculators
sought to partake in leveraged positions with hopes of achieving greater returns, and the
derivative space evolved. Exchanges such as OKEx and Huobi underwent sharp rises in
trade volume on their futures contracts, while new exchanges such as Bybit, Binance, and
FTX first entered the scene. As of May 16, 2021 the unregulated derivatives exchanges
held $16.4 billion worth of open interest (Skew.com, n.d.).
Some countries, most notably the United States, forbid their citizens to partake in trades
on these platforms (Chernin et al., 2020). Nevertheless, such derivative exchanges had
done little to prevent U.S. citizens from trading on these platforms until 2020. Now,
however, geo-restrictions have been implemented, and most platforms operate with KYC
and AML procedures in place. This transition towards KYC and AML erupted as the
CFTC and DOJ took action against what was then the largest unregulated bitcoin futures
exchange, BitMEX (Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, 2020).
In January 2020, BitMEX accounted for 36% of the total open interest in the bitcoin
futures market, but there was a fallout with the regulators and a fiery liquidation loop in
March 2020 (Le Calvez & Coin Metrics, 2020). Thus, the exchange experienced a sharp
decline in its active user base, and it currently holds only about 10% of the total open
interest in the market (Arcane Research, 2020).
The increased focus from U.S. regulators on the unregulated derivatives exchanges led,
BitMEX, Deribit, and FTX, among other entities, to implement KYC procedures. This
was an important step forward for the bitcoin derivative market. Overall, the trend in the
bitcoin derivatives markets seems to involve a growing focus on KYC-procedures from
unregulated exchanges.
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Another important step towards a more mature derivative market in bitcoin occurred on
December 18, 2017, when CME launched cash-settled bitcoin futures. The boundaries
to trade on CME compared with the unregulated platforms are far higher. That is, the
minimum contract size sits at five bitcoin, whereas the margin requirements are far more
conservative because traders are subject to a margin requirement of 37% (CME Group,
n.d.). The stiff requirements to trade on CME likely led CME’s bitcoin futures to hold a
relatively low share of the total open interest in the bitcoin futures market. In January of
2020, this figure was approximately 4%. However, because bitcoin has gained traction
among institutional investors in 2020, the open interest has grown in the CME bitcoin
futures. As of May 27, 2021, the open interest accounts for about 15% of the total open
interest in the bitcoin futures market (Skew.com, n.d.).
2.5 Perpetual swap contracts: inverse and linear
The perpetual swap contract in bitcoin is a fixed floating swap between two different
currencies, bitcoin, and either USD or a stablecoin. In this arrangement, the nominal
amount of one currency is rebalanced against the other currency, according to market
changes throughout the holding period. One side pays an interest rate, called the funding
rate, according to the price difference between the contract and the underlying spot index.
The funding rate is a tool to prevent divergence between the perpetual and the bitcoin spot
index. The funding rate equations and funding periods vary across the exchanges. Some
instruments use hourly funding periods, whereas most of the perpetuals have eight-hour
funding intervals. However, all of the perpetuals share the unique attribute of having no
fixed maturity. For bitcoin, this is highly beneficial, as it eliminates the need for rolling
over trades, something that could be risky due to the high volatility of bitcoin (Alexander
& Heck, 2020).
Although the first perpetual used bitcoin as the underlying collateral, some perpetuals
have used stablecoin collateral in recent years. Thus, traders have the option to speculate
on either inverse or linear perpetuals if they so desire.
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2.6 Futures
A futures contract represents a legal agreement to buy or sell a particular asset or security
at a given point in time in the future. The price of the contract is determined at the time
of which the contract is agreed upon (Alexander & Heck, 2020).
In the early years of the unregulated bitcoin futures market, the most common futures
instruments were the inverse bitcoin futures. The inverse contract in bitcoin is quoted
in USD, while its margin and profit and loss (PnL) is denominated in bitcoin (Hayes,
2017). Inverse contracts involve a negative gamma for long positions because the value of
the underlying margin declines when the bitcoin prices decline. However, inverse futures
are convenient instruments in short positions due to their opposite dynamics, with the
collateral increasing in value when the bitcoin price appreciates, leading to a positive
gamma.
In recent years, linear futures contracts have become more common in bitcoin. That
is, USD denominated linear futures, with margin and PnL in USD offered on CME.
Additionally, stablecoin denominated linear futures with margin and PnL in stablecoins,
most often USDT, is available on several unregulated bitcoin futures exchanges.
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3 Literature review
This section aims to provide an overview of relevant literature on the subject of the price
discovery process and highlight the existing literature on price discovery processes in
Bitcoin.
The work of this thesis relates to previous research conducted on the relationship between
the spot and derivative markets of bitcoin. This paper is a partial replica of a paper
published by Alexander & Heck (2020), but this study has further built on that one by
adding new and relevant price pairs. Compared with the data used in this previous paper
by Alexander and Heck, there has been a revolt in the futures market over the last year,
including a large shift in average daily volumes across the different exchanges (Skew.com,
n.d.). Additionally, this paper involves derivatives not included by Alexander and Heck,
with the introduction of linear futures and perpetuals settled in stablecoins. Therefore,
this should be an informative addition to existing literature.
Price discovery has been a topic for extensive research across a range of assets and
products. According to Garbade & Silber (1983), Flemming et al. (1996), and Silvapulle
& Moosa (1999) an array of reasons explain why futures should lead in established asset
classes. These include lower transaction costs, the absence of short-sale restrictions,
built-in leverage, and greater transparency.
Numerous researchers have studied price discovery over the years, and the prevailing view
in the literature is that future contracts dominate in price discovery processes. Kawaller et
al. (1987) demonstrated the leading role of futures contracts on the S&P 500 index. Many
years later, Chakravarty et al. (2004) used a modified version of the information share
(IS) approach to establish that the options market was leading the spot market for 60
stocks listed on the NYSE and options listed on CBOE. Furthermore, Figuerola-Ferretti
& Gonzalo (2010), Jin et al. (2018), and Bohmann et al. (2019) found similar results with
futures and options leading spot markets for commodities and other precious metals.
In contrast to the prevailing view in literature, some researchers have found that futures
do not lead in the price discovery process for all instances. In some cases, the spot markets
are the leading vehicle. This has been demonstrated by Cabrera et al. (2009) for Euro
and Japanese Yen exchange rates and by Shrestha (2014) for crude oil.
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Regarding the previously conducted research on price discovery processes in bitcoin, the
results have been inconclusive, both between spot and futures as well as within the spot
market. Schei & Rix-Nielsen (2019), Pagnottoni & Dimpfl (2019), and Dimpfl & Peter
(2020) all found different spot exchanges leading in the price discovery within the spot
market. Moreover, all of these papers used different models to analyze their data.
Beyond this, Corbet et al. (2018) investigated the spot market volatility of bitcoin after
the introduction of futures on CME and CBOE and further analyzed both price discovery
and whether the contracts were effective hedging instruments. These researchers used
minute-by-minute data for futures contracts on both exchanges and the spot market. In
their analysis, they found that the spot market volatility increased after the introduction of
futures contracts. They also tested different price discovery metrics such as IS (Hasbrouck,
1995), component share (CS) (Gonzalo & Granger, 1995), information leadership (Yan &
Zivot, 2010), and information leadership share (ILS) (Putnin, š, 2013). In all of these cases,
this team found that the spot market was leading in price discovery and claimed that the
traders using futures were uninformed noise traders.
Baur et al. (2018) further tested the results presented by Corbet et al. (2018), with similar
results. They used five-minute data from CME and CBOE for their future contracts’
prices. However, to align their work with the spot data from Binance, they manipulated
the data to obtain 15-minute intervals. In the analysis, they used IS (Hasbrouck, 1995)
and CS (Gonzalo & Granger, 1995), and both methods provided clear dominance of the
spot market over the futures market. Additionally, these researchers noted that some
key advantages of the spot market over the futures market are longer opening hours and
higher trading volumes.
In contrast to both Corbet et al. (2018) and Baur et al. (2018), Kapar & Olmo (2019)
tested the relationship between CME futures contracts and Coindesk’s spot index. Much
like the previous research papers, their team used IS by Hasbrouck (1995) and CS by
Gonzalo & Granger (1995). Unlike Corbet et al. (2018) and Baur et al. (2018), they
used daily data. They attributed these changes as a possible reason for why their results
differed from those of previous research, as both IS and CS find a clear dominance of
futures over the spot market. However, these results are in line with the prevailing view
in the literature of other assets.
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Adding to this body of work, Entrop et al. (2020) analyzed the price discovery by using
IS (Hasbrouck, 1995) and CS (Gonzalo & Granger, 1995). They also analyzed the impact
of trading volume, the bid-ask spread, relative numbers of quotes, spot market volatility,
and testing the market quality based on sentiment, attention, and macroeconomic news.
Their findings included effects of trading volume and trade size on price discovery metrics
while also finding a more important role of futures in high news-based sentiment periods.
Alexander et al. (2020) used BitMEX, the largest unregulated exchange at the time, to
check for price discovery. This team incorporated the largest derivative product available
at that time, the inverse perpetual. They used MIS (Lien & Shrestha, 2009) and CS
(Gonzalo & Granger, 1995) for price discovery through a four-dimensional VECM. This
was the first research that was conducted on an unregulated exchange, finding that the
product led the prices of the major spot exchanges.
Next, Fassas et al. (2020) conducted a price discovery analysis, along with an analysis of
volatility transmission between futures and spot. This team emphasized that volatility is a
proxy for information flow. They also expanded a traditional price discovery analysis with
a cointegration analysis to examine the length of time before a new futures market would
perform well in a price discovery function. As consensus in the literature, these researchers
found that the price discovery occurred in the futures market, while also finding that the
volatility of the markets was closely related to price discovery metrics.
Further developing the findings showing futures lead spot in bitcoin, Akyildirim et al.
(2020) tested whether CBOE or CME led the other, as well as their relationships to
the spot market. These findings are summarized as showing that futures led spot, and
that CBOE led CME, tested with IS (Hasbrouck, 1995), CS (Gonzalo & Granger, 1995),
information leadership (Yan & Zivot, 2010) and ILS (Putnin, š, 2013).
Alexander & Heck (2020) performed a price discovery analysis including 21 instruments on
bitcoin, many of them being from unregulated exchanges. By using GIS (Lien & Shrestha,
2014) and CS (Gonzalo & Granger, 1995), they found that unregulated exchanges led
the CME futures and spot market and that both CME and spot market reacted rather
slowly in some instances. They also concluded that the SEC’s decision not to approve any




A key theoretical principle for an efficient market is that the price of a security or an asset
should reflect its true or fundamental value (Lien & Shrestha, 2014). How the information
regarding the true or fundamental value is impounded into the market is called to be the
price discovery process (Hasbrouck, 1995). This thesis explores the price discovery process
of bitcoin by analyzing the minute-level data from the most relevant markets, including
both regulated and unregulated exchanges. The analysis will focus on price discovery
both within and across different exchanges and instruments. In the following paragraphs
are the justification for the hypotheses, and the concrete hypotheses for this master thesis.
The hypotheses are formulated as alternative hypotheses.
In the data, there are too many and too different instruments for it to be appropriate to
compare all at once for the entire period of our data. As of this, the different instruments
have been grouped within the market they trade, these groups are the spot market, the
perpetuals market, and the futures market. Within each group, the daily contributed
market innovation is tested and aggregated into a monthly information share. This thesis
is following the methodology of Alexander & Heck (2020) in this process. Within each
group, the analysis will likely uncover that some instruments contribute more in bitcoin’s
price discovery process, and lead the the bitcoin price discovery within the group. This
is measured by Generalized Information Share (GIS) (Lien & Shrestha, 2014). This will
align with previous research conducted on the topic.
H1: There will be indications of some exchanges leading the price discovery process in
each group.
Furthermore, in comparison between the different instruments on unregulated and
regulated exchanges, this study expects the futures contracts on CME to have a more
pronounced leadership role in the price discovery process in bitcoin, compared to the
results of Alexander & Heck (2020).




This section presents the data used in the analysis for the thesis. The bitcoin spot market
involves well above 100 spot exchanges. Likewise, the futures market is highly diverse and
competitive, with more than 10 vibrant offshore unregulated derivatives exchanges offering
various kinds of bitcoin futures, options, and perpetuals, in addition to the cash-settled
bitcoin futures on CME.
The thesis was based on minute-by-minute open-high-low-close-volume (OHLCV) data
from June 1, 2020 till April 30, 2021, from the relevant exchanges and price pairs for the
analysis. Within this period, bitcoin was in a strong bull market and grew from $9000 to
a peak of $64,000 on April 14 with a large inflow of institutional investors amid a period
of unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus globally.
The sample period is filled with volatile events, with futures both trading in a high
contango and also periods with futures trading in sharp backwardation. The research was
conducted on a total of 8.6 million observations from 21 different bitcoin instruments.
The price data was gathered through two different main sources. Price data on the CME
futures was obtained through the Bloomberg Terminal. All other prices were obtained
through HTML requests from CoinAPI. This was a formidable endeavor. CoinAPI has
request limitations of 100,000 lines of data per API-key per day. OHLCV data was
obtained from 20 instruments, each with approximately 435,000 observations per pair.
This required 87 different API requests. To avoid spending 87 days obtaining the data, 87
separate API-keys were created using VPNs and various email addresses to obtain the
data required for the thesis and avoid The Norwegian School of Economics being banned
by the CoinAPI servers.
Furthermore, open interest data from Skew.com was used to select the most relevant
instruments in the bitcoin futures market.
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5.1 Price pairs and markets
5.1.1 Spot market
From the spot market, data from Coinbase, Bitfinex, Bitstamp, Kraken, and Binance
was obtained. These spot markets are considered the largest spot markets measured
by real and legitimate trading volume. This is based on research conducted by Bitwise
Asset Management (2019) on the issue of wash trading and fake volumes in the bitcoin
markets. Coinbase, Bitfinex, Bitstamp, and Kraken have most of their trading volume
in fiat currencies, whereas a majority of the trading volume on Binance’s bitcoin spot
market is based on the stablecoin Tether.
5.1.2 The futures market
To adjust trading data on the futures market into a continuous time series, futures were
rolled over from the prompt to the next contract at midnight the day before expiration.
This was inspired by the methodology used by Alexander & Heck (2020) in their price
discovery analysis.
5.1.2.1 The regulated futures market
During the time period, there were only two regulated futures exchanges. CME offered
one future instrument, a linear futures contract settled in USD with a contract size of
five bitcoin, while the Intercontinental Exchange subsidiary Bakkt offered both inverse
and linear futures with a smaller contract size of 1 bitcoin. During the entire sample
period, CME dwarfed Bakkt in terms of both trading volume and open interest. As of
April 18, 2021, the open interest on CME’s bitcoin futures was 3887% the size of Bakkt.
Bakkt accounted for 0.3% of the open interest in the bitcoin futures market and was by
all accounts an insignificant player in the market. Thus, the thesis focused on the far
more popular futures market on CME and did not include Bakkt’s futures.
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Figure 5.1: Trading volume, Bakkt and CME
Note: This figure shows the trading volume on Bakkt and CME. The data is collected from Skew.com
(n.d.). The left axis shows the daily trade volume denoted in $ billions, and the right axis shows the
trading volume on Bakkt compared to the trading volume on CME.
CME offers monthly futures contracts, settled at 4 pm London time, on the last Friday of
each month. The contract settles at the simple unweighted average of the price of the
underlying Bitcoin Reference Rate index between 3 pm and 4 pm London time. The
Bitcoin Reference Rate index is based on the volume-weighted average price of BTCUSD
fetched from constituent exchanges Coinbase, Bitstamp, Kraken, Gemini, and itBit (CME
Group, n.d.).
The bitcoin futures on CME trades from Sunday to Friday 6 pm to 5 pm ET and are
also closed on holidays (CME Group, n.d.). In that regard, the CME futures is unique
in bitcoin. All other markets examined in this thesis are trading 24/7, 365 days a year
without interruption, which is a considerable disadvantage for the CME contracts in
contrast to the other investment tools available.
20 5.1 Price pairs and markets
5.1.2.2 The unregulated offshore futures market
In addition to the regulated futures market, the bitcoin trading ecosystem also has a large
and diverse unregulated futures market, with instruments available for trading 24/7, 365
days a year. In this thesis, the most relevant futures instruments were selected based
on open interest data fetched from Skew.com. This thesis, therefore, included data from
Binance, BitMEX, Deribit, FTX, Huobi, and OKEx.
Figure 5.2: Global open interest unregulated futures and perpetuals,
May 1 2020 - April 30 2021
Note: The figure shows the daily global open interest for bitcoin’s unregulated futures and perpetuals.
The data is collected from Skew.com (n.d.). The left axis shows the market share, and the right shows
the open interest in billion USD.
Table 5.1: Average share of global open interest, May 1 2020 - April 30 2021
Exchange Deribit Kraken OKEx FTX BitMEX
Open interest 7.19% 1.56 % 22.36 % 7.50 % 16.49 %
Exchange Bitfinex Huobi Bybit* Binance CoinFlex
Open interest 2.55 % 14.12 % 12.34 % 15.74 % 0.14 %
Note: The table shows the average share of global open interest for bitcoin’s unregulated futures and
perpetuals. The data is collected from Skew.com (n.d.).
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There are some key differences between the futures instruments available on the unregulated
exchanges. Data from linear futures settled in stablecoins were obtained from Binance,
FTX, and OKEx. Further, data from inverse futures was gathered from BitMEX, Deribit,
Huobi, and OKEx. The research was based on the quarterly futures available in these
markets, as they were the most frequently traded instruments and the futures instruments
with the highest open interest.
There are also minor differences in terms of contract specifications, margin requirements,
and underlying settlement indexes in these futures, summarized in table 5.2. In general,
the unregulated exchanges have far smaller unit sizes for contracts and enable far higher
leverage than the CME futures. This makes the unregulated market more accessible for
retail traders.
Table 5.2: Futures specifications
Exchange CME Binance FTX OKEx
Contract size 5 BTC 100 USD 0.0001 BTC 100 USD
Margin requirement 37% 0.8% 1% 0.8%
Settlement Cash in USD Cash in USDT Cash in stablecoins Cash in USDT
Trading days Weekdays 24/7 24/7 24/7













Exchange BitMEX Deribit Huobi OKEx
Contract size 1 USD 1 USD 100 USD 100 USD
Margin requirement 1% 1% 0.8% 0.8%
Settlement Cash in BTC Cash in BTC Cash in BTC Cash in BTC
Trading days 24/7 24/7 24/7 24/7












Note: This table describes the main specifications of the futures contracts used in this thesis. CME is the
only contract in this thesis with trading breaks. The settlement currency varies, depending on whether
the contract is linear or inverse. FTX’s settlement currency differs from the other linear futures, as the
settlement currency on FTX is a basket of various stablecoins consisting of USDC, TUSD, BUSD, PAX,
and HUSD.
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5.1.3 The perpetual swaps
The largest futures exchanges in the unregulated market offer perpetuals in addition to
the futures instruments mentioned previously. Perpetuals is a popular derivative in the
bitcoin markets, a thorough explanation of these instruments is presented in section 2.5.
Data on perpetuals are obtained from Bybit, Binance, BitMEX, Deribit, FTX, Huobi,
and OKEx.
The perpetuals instruments available through the various markets also have different
specifications depending on the exchange and instrument. Linear perpetuals offered by
Binance, FTX, and OKEx, and inverse perpetuals from BitMEX, Deribit, Huobi, Bybit,
and OKEx, was used in this thesis.
The perpetuals on these exchanges also differ in other aspects. Margin requirements vary,
in addition to some noteworthy differences in the funding rate mechanism across the
instruments summarized in table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Perpetuals specifications
Exchange Binance BitMEX Bybit Deribit
Margin 0.8% 1% 0.8% 1%
Funding rate 8 hrs 8 hrs 8 hrs Continous
Settlement currency USDT BTC BTC BTC
Exchange FTX Huobi OKEx Inverse OKEx
Margin 1% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8%
Funding rate 1 hr 8 hrs 8 hrs 8 hrs
Settlement currency Stablecoins BTC BTC USDT
Note: This table describes the main specifications of the perpetual swap contracts used in this thesis.
The settlement currency varies, depending on whether the contract is linear or inverse. FTX’s settlement
currency differs from the linear perpetual on Binance, as the settlement currency on FTX is a basket of
various stablecoins consisting of USDC, TUSD, BUSD, PAX, and HUSD.
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5.2 Data statistics
This section presents the summary statistics on the data obtained for the thesis. The
ADV illustrates the average daily trading volume for the full sample period measured in $
millions. The no-trade ratio (NTR) depicts the ratio of minutes where no trade occurred.
The no-trade ratio is calculated based on CME’s trading times, ignoring 5 pm to 6 pm
Chicago time and holidays.
Table 5.4: Data Statistics
Type Instrument Data start ADV NTR
Spot
Binance June 1, 2020 1791.60 7.54%
Bitfinex June 1, 2020 173.19 21.94%
Bitstamp June 1, 2020 192.39 1.43%
Coinbase June 1, 2020 523.63 0.16%
Kraken June 1, 2020 163.09 4.83%
Reg. Futures CME June 1, 2020 997.88 31.65%
Unreg. Futures
Binance August 5, 2020 632.36 4.31%
BitMEX June 1, 2020 64.06 12.48%
Deribit June 1, 2020 59.05 25.09%
FTX June 1, 2020 43.99 49.62%
Huobi June 1, 2020 3276.42 13.37%
OKEx USDT June 1, 2020 226.83 2.19%
OKEx inverse June 1, 2020 1270.91 28.47%
Perpetuals
Binance June 1, 2020 7710.48 0.25%
BitMEX June 1, 2020 2141.79 0.06%
Bybit June 1, 2020 3522.98 2.29%
Deribit June 1, 2020 491.54 8.81%
FTX June 1, 2020 1413.23 23.83%
Huobi June 1, 2020 4250.71 14.53%
OKEx USDT June 1, 2020 375.05 1.28%
OKEx inverse June 1, 2020 897.65 1.14%
Note: The table shows the date for which transaction data are available for each spot pair and derivative
instrument. The ADV is the average daily volume in million USD and the NTR is the ratio of minutes
without recorded transactions. The calculations of both ADV and NTR follows the opening hours on
each exchange, as presented in table 5.2 and 5.3.
The perpetual from BitMEX had the best NTR ratio of 0.06%, while the worst NTR was
found in the FTX futures due to low-quality data. Coinbase has the best NTR within
the spot market of 0.16%. Within the unregulated futures market, the linear OKEx
contract has the best NTR of 2.19%. The regulated CME futures has a NTR of 31.65%,
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in Alexander & Heck (2020) CME had a NTR of 43.18%. This suggests that the bitcoin
futures on CME has experienced more frequent trading from June 2020 till April 2021
than it saw from April 2019 until January 2020.
Table 5.5: Monthly ADV Spot Market
Month Coinbase Bitfinex* Kraken Bitstamp Binance**
June 20 106.91 46.70 50.40 66.46 475.90
July 20 100.53 38.61 38.07 63.38 475.94
August 20 159.11 54.72 49.93 72.81 706.50
September 20 121.68 45.39 41.66 74.68 611.66
October 20 133.11 51.29 49.83 71.32 615.11
November 20 316.25 164.50 122.08 157.96 1491.11
December 20 449.96 209.97 159.98 185.57 1783.62
January 21 1266.34 532.79 398.90 506.70 3810.85
February 21 1232.82 487.36 333.37 394.78 4116.50
March 21 1067.66 - 301.84 277.58 3672.86
April 21 851.63 - 258.57 257.75 3079.25
Note: This table shows the monthly ADV for the five spot exchanges from June 1, 2020, to April 30, 2021.
*Bitfinex data was missing from February 23 towards the end of the sample. The February ADV on
Bitfinex is adjusted to only account for the first 23 days of the month. A hyphen is inserted to illustrate
the missing data on Bitfinex in the last months. **Data was missing from the Binance spot pair from
April 7. The April ADV on Binance is adjusted to only account for the first seven days of the month.
Table 5.6: Monthly ADV Futures
Month Binance* BitMEX CME Deribit FTX** Huobi*** Okex linear OKEx inverse****
June 20 - 32.31 223.23 1.80 14.96 1461.55 177.30 356.00
July 20 - 34.74 264.44 1.69 15.35 2391.19 266.55 -
August 20 133.20 43.57 434.83 35.68 13.45 3112.04 257.24 -
September 20 85.76 32.19 403.23 30.43 17.80 1582.80 170.87 79.29
October 20 111.74 45.81 328.84 32.12 10.43 3308.63 294.84 563.16
November 20 453.49 63.04 655.45 62.77 21.87 3780.44 212.53 932.87
December 20 436.93 48.44 945.53 68.29 31.26 2547.48 185.07 781.54
January 21 1135.24 139.13 1867.53 91.28 86.38 7339.58 393.60 2712.36
February 21 1105.89 101.32 1849.23 122.30 50.26 6253.07 231.44 2033.16
March 21 910.43 58.16 2027.88 103.16 - 3224.43 148.22 1150.74
April 21 1260.31 112.31 1749.69 105.91 141.50 4355.46 180.10 1600.53
Note: This table shows the monthly ADV for the seven unregulated futures contracts from June 1, 2020,
to April 30, 2021. *The Binance futures was launched on August 5, 2020, and thus have no trading data
for the first two months of the period, up until August 5, 2020. **FTX data was missing from February
18 to April 9. The ADV in February and April is adjusted to only account for the days when the
contract traded. ***Huobi is missing data from October 1, 2020, to October 28, 2020; thus Huobi’s ADV
in October is adjusted to only account for the trading days with available data. ****The inverse Q3 2020
futures contract from OKEx’s was missing, leading to lacking data from June 26, 2020, to September 24,
2020. A hyphen is inserted to illustrate the missing data from the aforementioned contracts.
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In the spot market, see table 5.5, Binance’s BTCUSDT pair had the highest ADV at
$1791.6 million. In the futures market, the Huobi futures had the highest ADV at $3276.42
million, while Binance’s perpetual had the highest ADV of all instruments used in this
research with an ADV at $7710.48 million. Within the spot market, Binance had the
highest ADV in each month analyzed. Coinbase followed with the second-largest ADV
each month, while Bitfinex data was missing in the last two months of the time period.
Within the futures market, see table 5.6, Huobi had the highest ADV in each month
analyzed, except October, due to missing data. OKEx’s inverse futures was the instrument
with the second-highest ADV for most of the months in this sample, but also within
the inverse OKEx futures, data was missing. The entire Q3 contract of OKEx’s inverse
futures was missing in the data set.
Binance’s futures was launched on August 5, 2020. Therefore, a hyphen was added on
the first two months of the sample on Binance’s ADV. The ADV of Binance’s futures has
grown month over month, and in April, the Binance futures hit an ADV of $1260 million.
CME was the third-largest futures market in terms of trading volume and saw its ADV
surpass $2 billion in March.
Table 5.7: Monthly ADV Perpetuals
Month BitMEX Bybit Deribit Huobi* OKEx linear OKEx inverse Binance FTX**
June 20 1364.09 704.94 9.51 2231.51 400.70 387.03 2109.55 218.31
July 20 1227.66 686.73 8.36 2137.44 370.86 398.26 1825.53 177.16
August 20 1764.13 1128.98 256.04 3069.91 390.91 526.78 2530.94 242.47
September 20 1388.97 740.70 182.74 2265.20 357.21 491.37 2280.20 274.14
October 20 1283.54 953.94 241.78 4746.51 319.01 426.12 2900.29 403.71
November 20 2164.79 2556.48 410.86 5688.31 455.79 805.88 6829.44 1017.38
December 20 2176.84 2365.21 447.15 4272.55 374.82 995.05 7074.38 1203.69
January 21 3665.34 6485.83 875.82 9165.89 512.02 1635.63 13807.06 2735.82
February 21 3108.55 7142.99 1111.22 6627.68 351.63 1449.29 14532.02 2980.82
March 21 2607.98 8453.72 953.37 5599.57 319.55 1461.49 16635.68 -
April 21 2876.40 7810.02 956.94 5425.55 270.28 1332.13 14794.60 3211.23
Note: This table shows the monthly ADV for the eight perpetual swaps contracts from June 1, 2020, to
April 30, 2021. *Huobi is missing data from October 1, 2020, to October 28, 2020, thus Huobi’s ADV in
October is adjusted to only account for the trading days with available data. **FTX data was missing
from February 18 to April 9. A hyphen is inserted to illustrate the missing data from these contracts,
while the ADV in February and April is adjusted to only account for the days when the contract traded.
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Binance’s stablecoin settled perpetual had the highest ADV of all instruments used in this
research, see table 5.7. Throughout 2021, the Binance perpetual had an ADV above $10
billion as the only instrument examined in this thesis. Bybit had the second-largest ADV
of all the perpetuals, and also had the second-largest ADV of all instruments analyzed in
this thesis in 2021.
BitMEX’s perpetual used to be the most heavily traded instrument in bitcoin, but it
got surpassed by Binance, Bybit, Huobi and FTX in terms of trading volume after a
rough 2020 for the exchange and its founders, who originally launched the first perpetual
instrument back in 2016.
Figure 5.3: Monthly ADV by instrument type
Note: This figure illustrates the sum of the monthly ADV from June 1, 2020, to April 30, 2021, for all
instruments used in this thesis. The trading volume has been grouped into three groups, the spot market,
the futures market, and the perpetual swaps market.
The derivatives market was clearly dominating the trading volume in bitcoin during our
sample. Within the derivatives, the bitcoin perpetuals saw a larger trading volume than
the bitcoin futures. The aggregated ADV across all markets peaked in January at $60
billion and since remained above $50 billion, far higher than the ADV in H2, 2020. This
could be explained by bitcoin surpassing its 2017 peak (the former all-time high) on
December 16, 2020, with bitcoin for the first time surpassing $20,000.
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Figure 5.4: Relative trading volume
Note: This figure shows the relative trading volume from June 2020 till April 2021. Panel A represents
the overall for the main instruments, panel B is for the spot market, panel C for the perpetual market,
and panel D for the futures market (regulated and unregulated combined).
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6 Methodology
The methodology section first introduces the vector error correction model and IS. These
components form the foundation for the method used in this paper, the GIS (Lien &
Shrestha, 2014). This study follows the methodology of Alexander & Heck (2020), where
they used both GIS (Lien & Shrestha, 2014) and CS (Gonzalo & Granger, 1995), and
found similar results for both methods. Yan & Zivot (2010) investigated IS and CS
to determine their effectiveness and discovered that CS does not provide details of the
informativeness of individual markets. CS also has a possible outcome of negative results
in some markets (Alexander & Heck, 2020). We have thus chosen not to include CS in
this paper and thus only use GIS.
Other considered methods for the price discovery method besides GIS and CS, was
IS (Hasbrouck, 1995), MIS (Lien & Shrestha, 2009), information leadership (Yan &
Zivot, 2010), and ILS (Putnin, š, 2013). However, as IS, MIS, information leadership and
ILS are specified for bivariate models, they are excluded from this study looking into
multi-dimensional information flows.
The desired outcome by using GIS as the method for this thesis is to find indications
of which market and which derivative instrument or spot pair are leading in the price
discovery process. Based on the researched methods for this thesis, this method appears
to be the most optimal alternative to answer the hypotheses due to its ability to handle
multivariate data and instruments that are not on the exact same but cointegrated and
exist in interrelated markets (Lien & Shrestha, 2014).
6.1 Vector error correction model
The vector error correction model forms the basis for the methodology of IS, and GIS,
relying on equations and methodology presented by Engle & Granger (1987). An individual
variable, viewed by itself might wander extensively. However, considering several variables
that have the same underlying asset, such as bitcoin, the variables will probably not
wander too far apart from each other. Large fluctuations in the short-run might occur,
but the prices will converge towards equilibrium of one common implied efficient price
in the long-run. The time series moving towards an equilibrium is a prerequisite for the
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VECM and a part of the theory for price discovery. When this happens, the prices are
said to be cointegrated and have an underlying stochastic trend (Lien & Shrestha, 2014).
To test and confirm the existence of cointegration relationship between the different
spot and derivative instruments, this thesis relies on cointegration testing following the
Johansen procedure (Johansen, 1988). One benefit of this procedure is that it applies to
multivariate time series.
The procedure begins with a null hypothesis stating that the number of cointegrated
relationships of the time series is zero. The alternative hypothesis is that there are more
than zero cointegrated relationships. If the null hypothesis is rejected, a new test with
the null hypothesis of one cointegrated relationship and the alternative hypothesis being
more than one cointegrated relationship ensues. This process is repeated until the null
hypothesis can no longer be rejected at a 1% or 5% critical value (Johansen, 1988).
This thesis tested the cointegration relationships, in contrast to previous literature on
bitcoin price discovery, as previous literature has assumed the cointegration relationship
exist. This assumptions is based on arbitrage dynamics as the instruments track the same
underlying asset, and should therefore be cointegrated (Alexander & Heck, 2020). Thus,
the prices should not diverge in the long-run. As a result of the cointegrated relationships,
a linear combination of non-stationary variables might be stationary (Enders, 2008).
When the Johansen procedure confirms the existence of a cointegrated relationship
between all of the time series used in the data set, a VECM is formed. This confirmation
of cointegrated time series and the formation of a VECM will allow the analysis to respond
to the hypothesis in this thesis. If the prices were not cointegrated, the data would not
comply with the requirements of GIS (Lien & Shrestha, 2014), and the analysis would not
be performed.
To present the equation framework of the VECM and price discovery processes, one can
let pt be a N × 1 vector of the (log) prices of N instruments at the time t. There is also
an assumed (N − 1) cointegrating vectors. Thus, this study present the equation with its
basis from Engle & Granger (1987) for the VECM:
∆pt = α +
q−1∑
i=1
Γi∆pt−i + δzt−1 + et (6.1)
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Equation 6.1 assumes that α is a constant, δ is a N × (N − 1) error correction matrix
and Γi represents some N ×N parameter matrices. Additionally, δ represents the prices’
reactions to temporary deviations from the long-run equilibrium. Lastly, et is a vector of
serially uncorrelated innovations of zero mean with covariance matrix Ω.
Further development of this equation is used to transform it into a vector moving average
(VMA) model. The form used is then written as follows:
∆pt = Ψ(L)et (6.2)
The Ψ denotes a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L. When integrated, this equation
becomes the following expression.





In this equation, p0 is a constant vector. The sum of the moving average is represented
by Ψ(1) and Ψ∗(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator. As was previously
assumed, the cointegration relationship for this time series coincides with the Engle-
Granger representation theorem (Engle & Granger, 1987). This implies that the following
conditions hold (De Jong, 2002; Lehmann, 2002):
βTΨ(1) = 0 and Ψ(1)α = 0 (6.4)
Because both of these expressions are identical, one can assume that all pairwise
cointegration relationships are of the form (1,−1)T . Thus, the common row vector
is denoted by ψ.
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The equations used above were used by Hasbrouck (1995) in the development of the
method of IS. The IS of each market is its relative contribution to the innovations of the
common implicit efficient price for every market. As it is only a bivariate model, due to
the requirement of the time series being integrated in a one-to-one order, the value of
the two different variables is equal to one, finding the upper and lower boundaries for
each analyzed time series contribution to the price discovery. The method starts by using
the VECM developed above and transforming it as illustrated to a VMA. First, by the
inclusion of the VMA, the equation formulated by Hasbrouck (1995) is:
∆pt = ψ(L)et (6.5)





for i = 1, ..., N. (6.6)
Where ψF represents the ith element of the row vector ψF , and F is the lower triangular
matrix of the Cholesky decomposition of Ω. The ISi of each market denotes how much of
a contribution to the innovation in the long-run equilibrium is done by the i-time series,
also known as the ith market.
6.3 Generalized information share
GIS was introduced as a further development of the IS by Hasbrouck (1995) and MIS
(Lien & Shrestha, 2009) where IS and MIS was generalized. The method was introduced
by Lien & Shrestha (2014). One benefit of the GIS compared with the IS is that the
former does not require a one-to-one cointegration relationship between the time series
used in the equations. Thus, this method can be used on interrelated markets and not
only identical markets, as it requires only that all n unit-root series are driven by a single
stochastic trend. This can be validated by checking if there exists a n− 1 cointegrating
vectors among n series, tested with the Johansen procedure. In the analysis conducted in
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this thesis, GIS is a fitting method because the study used N similar or homogeneous
instruments. Thus, the structure of the GIS method deviates from the IS by changing
the requirement for the β matrix of the cointegrated vectors. Making this alternation









Where ψG = ψr1FM , FM = [G ∧−1/2 GTV −1]−1. Beyond this, ∧ is the diagonal matrix
containing the characteristic root of the correlation matrix on the diagonal, and the
corresponding eigenvectors are given by Matrix G. Finally, V is a diagonal matrix
containing the innovation standard deviations on the diagonal.
The result of all markets analyzed for each group using GIS will similarly to the IS
(Hasbrouck, 1995) also sum to 1. The result per derivative instrument or spot pair will
then be the percentage of contribution to the innovation in the price discovery, leading to
one common implied efficient price (Lien & Shrestha, 2014).
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7 Analysis
This part of the thesis presents the results of the analysis and a discussion regarding the
results obtained. The analysis is based on a grouping of the different instruments by
category. The grouping constitutes three markets, the spot market, unregulated futures,
and perpetuals. Within each group, the GIS method is applied. A fourth group consisting
of the main derivative instruments and spot pairs, hereby shortened to main instruments,
is then created. The main instruments are selected based on the results within the analysis
of the three sectors. Additionally, CME data has been added to the main instrument
analysis. The GIS methodology is applied to the fourth group in order to identify the
most relevant leading instruments in the price discovery of bitcoin.
The results of the analysis in this study are made using the minute-by-minute OHLCV
data from June 1, 2020 till April 30, 2021. The analysis is based on daily calculations
of the GIS for each of the instruments. The daily GIS is then converted to a monthly
GIS based on a non-weighted average of the daily observations. As the analysis is using
transaction prices for actual trades and not mid-quotes data, there are occasions of
infrequent trading. Illiquidity in the market might affect the results of the price discovery
process. To avoid this issue, instruments seeing 4,5 hours or more between two subsequent
trades are excluded from the daily GIS analysis, as in Alexander & Heck (2020). We
have used the last traded price for shorter periods with no trading as a substitute for no
recorded transaction price.
Regarding the selection of lags in the model, the analysis follows the method proposed by
Alexander & Heck (2020) and uses 1 lag for all models. By applying the same methodology
as Alexander and Heck, the results from this thesis are directly comparable and analogous
to the previous research, while being based on a different time period.
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Before applying the VECM method, cointegration relationships in the instruments must be
identified. Therefore, a cointegration test following the Johansen procedure is performed
on the time series, identifying that they are cointegrated. In table 7.1, we show the results
from the Johansen procedure on the instruments used in this thesis.
It is worth dwelling on the results from the spot market. The analysis is based on spot
data for bitcoin traded against both USDT and USD. The Johansen procedure shows that
the USDT pair is, in fact, cointegrated with the USD denominated spot pairs.





















Test statistic 72899.07 54943.52 6210.08 3867.59 4.81
1 pct 42.36 36.65 30.34 23.65 16.26
Unreg. futures
Test statistic 1700.79 978.00 768.24 436.52 280.08 47.22 4.58
1 pct 54.71 49.51 42.36 36.65 30.34 23.65 16.26
Perpetuals
Test statistic 41510.62 29720.79 16928.18 12992.95 8983.42 566.36 1624.80 5.48
1 pct 62.46 54.71 49.51 42.36 36.65 30.34 23.65 16.26
Final group
Test statistic 40628.57 21157.86 3816.38 180.24 76.84 6.98
p value 49.51 42.36 36.65 30.34 23.65 16.26
Note: The table shows the results of the Johansen procedure for testing cointegrated relationships in
each group. For spot, the null hypothesis of 4 cointegrated relationships is not rejected. For unregulated
futures, the null hypothesis of 6 cointegrated relationships is not rejected. For perpetuals, the null
hypothesis of 7 cointegrated relationships is not rejected. For the main instruments, the null hypothesis
of 5 cointegrated relationships is not rejected. All rejections are based on 0,01 significance levels.
7.2 The spot market 35
7.2 The spot market
The analysis begins by analyzing the day-by-day price discovery within the spot market.
All spot markets analyzed trade 24/7, so the analysis is based on UTC days. On days
when the exchanges lack trading data, the exchange is removed from the analysis, and its
market share equals 0% that day.
The spot market data was consistent and of high quality up until February. Data was
missing from Bitfinex following February 23, and the data was also missing from the
Binance spot market from April 7. This was not caused by no occurring trades, but
rather missing data, so for further analysis, the values post February 23 might be slightly
distorted.
Table 7.2 shows the monthly GIS for the different exchanges, while figure 7.1 shows the
14-day moving average of the daily GIS time series.
Table 7.2: Monthly shares of GIS for the spot market
Month Coinbase Kraken Bitstamp Binance* Bitfinex**
Jun-20 25.88 % 11.87 % 12.22 % 36.32 % 13.70 %
Jul-20 22.80 % 7.38 % 12.30 % 47.03 % 10.48 %
Aug-20 22.86 % 7.36 % 14.64 % 42.34 % 12.80 %
Sep-20 26.15 % 8.60 % 17.00 % 34.47 % 13.78 %
Oct-20 29.83 % 7.61 % 12.93 % 37.67 % 11.97 %
Nov-20 25.31 % 11.04 % 17.50 % 29.68 % 16.46 %
Dec-20 26.22 % 10.41 % 18.65 % 25.11 % 19.61 %
Jan-21 20.16 % 13.37 % 16.93 % 25.01 % 24.53 %
Feb-21 22.70 % 15.21 % 20.02 % 26.51 % 15.56 %
Mar-21 30.26 % 17.09 % 20.18 % 32.46 % -
Apr-21 43.26 % 21.35 % 27.28 % 8.12 % -
Full sample 26.86 % 11.94 % 17.24 % 31.34 % 12.63 %
Note: This table shows the monthly GIS for the five spot exchanges from June 1, 2020, to April 30, 2021.
*Data was missing from the Binance spot pair from April 7, reducing the GIS of Binance in April.
**Bitfinex data was missing from February 23 towards the end of the sample. A hyphen is inserted to
illustrate the missing data on Bitfinex in these months.
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Figure 7.1: GIS spot market: 14 day moving average
Note: This figure shows the time series of the daily GIS of the five spot pairs from June 1, 2020, to April
30, 2021. The daily GIS is smoothed with a 14-day moving average. *Data was missing from the Binance
spot pair from April 7, reducing the GIS of Binance in April. **Bitfinex data was missing from February
23 towards the end of the sample.
The two leading exchanges in terms of trading volume in the spot market also led in
terms of bitcoin’s price discovery. This aligns with the findings of Chen & Tsai (2017),
finding that speculation is often beneficial for price discovery. For the entire sample period,
Coinbase has an average GIS of 27%, whereas Binance has an average GIS of 31%, despite
lacking observations for the final 23 days. Based on the results, it is clear that Binance
and Coinbase have led the price discovery within the spot market.
In 9 out of the 10 months with complete datasets available from Binance, the Binance
BTCUSDT spot pair led the price discovery within the spot market. However, the share
of Binance’s GIS saw a declining trend from sitting above 40% during the beginning of
the time series, and down towards 25-30% for the latter part of the time series.
Coinbase’s share of the GIS has been more stable throughout the observation period
and trended upwards, particularly going into Q4, 2020. Large investors are said to have
used Coinbase’s brokerage solution to conduct large trades throughout this period. This
could explain Coinbase’s strength in this period. In December, Coinbase was the largest
contributor to the GIS in the spot market, reaching 26%.
Kraken and Bitstamp have played a minor role in the price discovery within the spot
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market, with the monthly GIS fluctuating between 7% to 21% on Kraken, and 12% and
27% on Bitstamp. Both Kraken and Bitstamp peaked towards the end of the time series
when Bitfinex and Binance data were missing. The low GIS of Kraken and Bitstamp
indicates that these spot pairs mainly follows the other spot pairs.
Bitfinex saw a spike in their GIS in January and had the second-largest GIS of 24.53%.
Unfortunately, Bitfinex data was unavailable following February 23, so it is unclear whether
this trend persisted.
Coinbase and Binance’s dominating role in the price discovery within the spot market
is worth examining further, both due to their substantial GIS and also due to the fact
that they reflect different underlying currencies. Binance is based on USDT denominated
trades, and Coinbase is based on USD denominated trades. Our results indicate that
both instruments have an important role in bitcoin’s price discovery. Thus, we elected
both instruments in the final GIS-model scoping the most pronounced leading instruments
within each group.
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The analysis further examines the unregulated bitcoin futures market using the day-by-day
price discovery of the dominating instruments in the market. Similar to the bitcoin spot
market, unregulated futures also trade 24/7.
In the dataset, there were some unfortunate issues. In particular, the data from FTX
saw missing values from February 18 to April 9. This reduced the GIS of FTX for the
full sample period, in addition to the latter months. Throughout the sample, FTX has
only held minor shares of the GIS in the futures market. While it is unfortunate that the
FTX futures data is incomplete, it does not impact our conclusion of the price discovery
leadership within the unregulated futures market.
There are also occasional days where the data was blank for long periods or the entire
day for certain instruments. These instruments have been excluded from the analysis for
that particular day. For most of these instruments, the missing data was a short-term
problem, and the instruments were included in the GIS model the following day. We do
not believe this to have a large enough impact on the results to distort the results in a
substantial manner.
However, one large missing piece of data is worth mentioning. The dataset miss data from
the Q3, 2020 inverse contract on OKEx. This reduces the full sample period GIS of the
instrument considerably. OKEx’s futures have a high GIS in the remainder of the sample
period. Additionally, Binance launched its bitcoin futures on August 5, 2020, so there is
no data recorded before this.
Therefore, we analyze two different periods. One period for the full sample and another
for a sample period from October until April. We did this to improve the conclusions of
the information leadership within the unregulated futures market.
Table 7.3 shows the monthly GIS across each instrument, while figure 7.2 illustrates the
time series of the GIS in the futures market with a 14-day moving average.
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Table 7.3: Monthly shares of GIS for the unregulated futures market
Month Binance* BitMEX Deribit FTX** Huobi*** OKEx linear OKEx inverse****
Jun-20 - 12.09 % 13.94 % 8.15 % 20.57 % 20.71 % 24.54 %
Jul-20 - 20.30 % 8.22 % 11.93 % 38.42 % 21.13 % -
Aug-20 19.32 % 20.64 % 10.61 % 3.65 % 27.43 % 18.35 % -
Sep-20 13.38 % 14.08 % 10.53 % 7.47 % 15.71 % 32.57 % 6.26 %
Oct-20 13.85 % 30.78 % 16.21 % 5.45 % 3.65 % 10.12 % 19.95 %
Nov-20 11.32 % 15.41 % 12.13 % 4.96 % 17.19 % 17.26 % 21.72 %
Dec-20 10.13 % 9.84 % 17.02 % 6.55 % 17.47 % 23.03 % 15.94 %
Jan-21 17.04 % 10.98 % 6.67 % 9.28 % 22.66 % 20.60 % 12.78 %
Feb-21 18.58 % 7.61 % 16.18 % 2.18 % 21.66 % 15.25 % 18.53 %
Mar-21 20.93 % 8.77 % 8.57 % - 17.69 % 19.28 % 24.72 %
Apr-21 13.78 % 16.48 % 17.95 % 6.67 % 15.00 % 12.44 % 17.67 %
Full sample 12.58 % 15.18 % 12.55 % 6.03 % 19.77 % 19.16 % 14.74 %
Oct-Apr 15.09 % 14.27 % 13.53 % 5.01 % 16.48 % 16.85 % 18.76 %
Note: This table shows the monthly GIS for the seven unregulated futures contracts from June 1, 2020,
to April 30, 2021. *The Binance futures was launched on August 5, 2020, and thus have no trading data
for the first two months of the period, up until August 5, 2020. **FTX data was missing from February
18 to April 9. ***The October data on Huobi is distorted due to missing data from October 1, 2020, to
October 28, 2020. ****The inverse Q3 2020 futures contract from OKEx’s was missing, leading to
lacking data from June 26, 2020, to September 24, 2020. A hyphen is inserted to illustrate the missing
data from the aforementioned contracts. Additionally, an aggregated GIS from October 2020 to April
2021 is added to illustrate the GIS in the unregulated futures market when the data quality is better.
The results suggests that Huobi and OKEx are the leading instruments within the
unregulated bitcoin futures.
With its large trading volume, it is not a surprise that Huobi’s futures instruments tend
to lead in terms of price discovery. Huobi held the largest share of the GIS in 3 of the 10
months analyzed, whereas the OKEx inverse contract also led in 3 instances. OKEx’s 2
instruments and Huobi’s instrument combined accounts for 52% of the GIS for the entire
duration of the sample.
Since launching, Binance has also had a substantial GIS, but it has to this day never
been the major monthly contributor to the price discovery within the unregulated futures
market.
The most surprising observation within the price discovery of the unregulated bitcoin
futures is the significant contributions from Deribit. The results suggest that Deribit has
an important role in the price discovery within the unregulated futures market, despite
the low trading volume on the Deribit futures compared to its peers.
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Figure 7.2: GIS unregulated futures market: 14 day moving average
Note: This figure shows the time series of the daily GIS of the seven unregulated futures contracts from
June 1, 2020, to April 30, 2021. The daily GIS is smoothed with a 14-day moving average. *The Binance
futures was launched on August 5, 2020, and thus have no trading data for the first two months of the
period, up until August 5, 2020. **FTX data was missing from February 18 to April 9. ***The October
data on Huobi is distorted due to missing from October 1, 2020, to October 28, 2020. ****The inverse
Q3 2020 futures contract from OKEx was missing, leading to missing data from June 26, 2020, to
September 24, 2020.
In April, Deribit’s futures had the largest GIS of all instruments at 17.95%, while the
instrument saw an ADV of $105 million in the month compared to Huobi’s $4356 million.
The traders on Deribit’s futures are seemingly more informed, contributing significantly
to the price discovery within the futures market.
An explanation for Deribit’s considerable contribution in the unregulated futures market
despite the low trading volumes could be Deribit’s market-leading role within options
trading. Deribit offers plain vanilla European-styled bitcoin options and is by far the
leading exchange in terms of open interest in the bitcoin options market, accounting for
near 90% of all the open interest in the market (Arcane Research, 2021a). The options
use Deribit’s futures as the underlying settlement. Activity on Deribit options could affect
the information flow to the underlying futures on Deribit.
Due to the dominance of Huobi and OKEx’s instruments throughout the observation
period, we include their instruments when measuring the GIS for the main instruments in
section 7.4.
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In the third group, we analyze the bitcoin perpetuals using the day-by-day price discovery
of the dominating instruments in the market. Like the spot market and the unregulated
futures market, the perpetuals trade 24/7, 365 days a year.
Data on FTX perpetual was unavailable from February 18 to April 9, and we also missed
data on the Huobi perpetual for the majority of October. This affects the GIS observations.
As we highlight later, FTX’s GIS on the perpetual has been trending upwards, suggesting
that FTX’s perpetual is an important instrument in the price discovery within the
perpetuals instruments. Therefore, we will be careful with making any firm conclusions
surrounding the leadership role of FTX in the perpetuals market in our analysis based on
the full sample GIS.
In the data of the perpetuals, we also experienced some occurrences of data missing from
random dates in the dataset. This was similar to the observations of the data for the
unregulated futures contracts. Again, the effect of some eliminations of single dates is not
something that we believe has a large impact on the results.
In table 7.4 we report the monthly average price discovery shares of the eight perpetuals
analyzed in this thesis, and in figure 7.3 we show the 14-day moving average time series
of the GIS between perpetuals.
Table 7.4: Monthly shares of GIS for the perpetuals market
Month BitMEX Binance Bybit Deribit FTX* Huobi** OKExUSD OKExUSDT
June, 2020 12.99 % 19.11 % 10.55 % 8.61 % 10.40 % 7.01 % 12.98 % 18.35 %
July, 2020 11.88 % 32.88 % 7.72 % 5.01 % 13.75 % 4.97 % 10.36 % 13.43 %
August, 2020 11.21 % 25.98 % 7.47 % 8.60 % 14.95 % 6.44 % 12.64 % 12.71 %
September, 2020 13.08 % 23.11 % 8.03 % 12.63 % 16.31 % 6.08 % 7.86 % 12.90 %
October, 2020 12.98 % 27.67 % 7.97 % 14.85 % 15.22 % 0.45 % 9.85 % 11.02 %
November, 2020 12.16 % 13.36 % 9.05 % 11.85 % 9.92 % 7.66 % 21.58 % 14.42 %
December, 2020 12.51 % 14.16 % 7.79 % 13.95 % 23.91 % 5.95 % 8.59 % 13.15 %
January, 2021 13.09 % 16.08 % 17.94 % 9.44 % 9.53 % 11.60 % 12.88 % 9.44 %
February, 2021 15.30 % 15.25 % 12.20 % 17.26 % 8.79 % 9.16 % 11.45 % 10.59 %
March, 2021 14.34 % 23.76 % 13.47 % 14.73 % - 7.45 % 12.36 % 13.89 %
April, 2021 13.23 % 12.20 % 9.72 % 14.90 % 15.53 % 10.42 % 10.54 % 13.46 %
Full period 12.98 % 20.32 % 10.17 % 11.98 % 12.57 % 7.02 % 11.92 % 13.03 %
Note: This table shows the monthly GIS for the eight perpetual contracts from June 1, 2020, to April 30,
2021. *FTX data was missing from February 18 to April 9. A hyphen is inserted to illustrate the missing
data from these contracts. **The October data on Huobi is distorted due to missing from October 1,
2020, to October 28, 2020.
42 7.4 The perpetual swaps market
For the entire observation period, Binance’s stablecoin margined perpetual has been
the leading instrument among the perpetuals, accounting for 20.32% of the GIS for the
entire duration of the sample. Binance had a particularly strong leading role among the
perpetuals in the first five months analyzed. In the last months, the Binance leadership
became less pronounced, as Binance has only led once in 2021, in March. This is
surprising given how Binance has seen the largest trading volume by far among perpetuals,
particularly in 2021, with the ADV being above $10 billion for the first four months of
2021.
Figure 7.3: GIS perpetuals market: 14 day moving average
Note: This figure shows the time series of the daily GIS of the eight perpetual swaps contracts from June
1, 2020, to April 30, 2021. The daily GIS is smoothed with a 14-day moving average. *FTX data was
missing from February 18 to April 9. A hyphen is inserted to illustrate the missing data from these
contracts. **The October data on Huobi is distorted due to missing from October 1, 2020, to October 28,
2020.
Similarly, the low GIS of Bybit is also surprising. Bybit is the second largest in terms of
ADV among the perpetuals for the full duration of the sample but only leads in January.
Bybit has the second-lowest GIS for the full sample period of all perpetuals analyzed.
Thus, despite Bybit’s large trading volume, the Bybit perpetual in general contribute
little to bitcoin’s price discovery. Bybit mostly reacts to price movements in the other
perpetuals.
The less pronounced dominance on Binance and Bybit despite their large trading volumes
could be a result of less informed and less sophisticated traders. Both exchanges focus
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heavily on retail customers, and the available leverage on the platforms is frequently
advertised. On Binance, 20x leverage is the preset input on trades, alebit, it is possible to
conduct trades with lower leverage. The preset input leverage could possibly be nudging
traders to deploy high leverage in their trades, leading to many liquidations during
volatile events. This might lead to an increased basis in these perpetual instruments,
over-emphasizing the direction of the price movement in the general market.
Figure 7.4: Bybt.com: Liquidated longs and shorts - April 2021
Note: This figure shows the volume of liquidated long and short positions in the perpetuals from April 1,
2020, to April 30, 2021. Notice the spike on April 18, 2020, with a total of $4.87 billion liquidated long
positions. Of the liquidated longs, $836 million originated from Bybit, and $1970 million from Binance.
On April 18, bitcoin saw large intraday volatility, with bitcoin seeing an intraday high of $60,400 and an
intraday low of $51,500 before ending the day trading at $56,300. This figure serves the purpose of
illustrating the impact of the volatility spike, in addition to highlighting the high leverage used on Bybit
and Binance. The data is gathered from bybt.com (n.d.).
The Binance futures market is also pushing the narrative of easy on-boarding and extreme
leverage. The first message looming over the screen for new visitors on Binance futures
highlights this, “Trade Crypto Futures with up to 125x Leverage. Open an account in
under 30 seconds.” clearly focusing on retail speculators. Amid high volatility, traders on
Binance and Bybit have frequently been “victims” of large squeezes, in particular for long
positions. This leads the spreads between the spot indexes and the Bybit and Binance
perpetuals to widen, and with the low GIS, particularly on Bybit, this seems to be an
isolated price shock, not impacting the broad markets. During downside volatility, the
impact on these perpetuals tends to be particularly exaggerated. Overextended longs get
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liquidated, exemplified by the crash of April 18, 2021, leading $4.87 billion worth of long
positions to be automatically liquidated, with $836 million and $1970 million worth of
longs being liquidated on Bybit and Binance’s perpetuals alone.
Surprisingly, both Deribit and FTX have seen months with the instruments leading in
terms of price discovery, despite seeing ADVs far below Binance and Bybit. Deribit led
in February, while the ADV of Binance was 12 times as large as Deribit’s, suggesting
that Deribit traders are more informed and sophisticated. Similarly, FTX led both in
December and April. FTX leading in April is quite remarkable, given that we miss data
from April 1 till April 9 in our data set. By the end of April, FTX was clearly leading in
terms of GIS, while all other perpetuals analyzed saw relatively similar price discovery
contributions, suggesting that FTX’s perpetual is becoming a more important instrument
in the perpetuals market.
Figure 7.5: GIS perpetuals: April, 2021 (14d MA)
Note: This figure shows the linear time series of the daily GIS of the eight perpetual swaps contracts
from April 1, 2021, to April 30, 2021, smoothed with a 14-day moving average. It illustrates the growing
GIS of FTX in April. FTX data from April 1 to April 9 was missing, and the 14-day moving average GIS
of FTX on April 30, 2021, ended at 24%, substantially higher than the runner-up Deribit at 15%. This
implies a growing leadership role of the FTX perpetual.
Due to missing data observations, and Binance’s leading role in terms of GIS for the entire
duration of the sample, we only append the Binance perpetual in the final GIS test.
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Lastly, we examine the leading instruments within each category, in addition to the CME
futures, in a final GIS model. The purpose is to uncover the most important instruments
in bitcoin’s price discovery during the bull market of June 2020 till April 2021. We
analyze the GIS of the stablecoin spot pair from Binance, Coinbase’s BTCUSD spot pair,
Binance’s stablecoin margined perpetual, the Huobi futures, OKEx futures, and CME
futures.
In order to adjust for CME’s trading breaks, we exclude holidays, weekends, and the
daily hourly trading break on the CME futures from 5 pm to 6 pm Chicago time. We
thus analyze the instruments once they are available to trade on all exchanges. This
could overemphasize the role of CME’s bitcoin futures in bitcoin’s price discovery due to
weekend volatility.
As trading data on the Q3 futures of OKEx’s inverse futures was missing, we use the
stablecoin margined futures on OKEx in the first four months. We then implement the
inverse futures from October. We justify this choice with our previous results suggesting the
importance of the inverse OKEx instrument within the price discovery in the unregulated
futures market when all instruments have data.
Table 7.5 shows the monthly average GIS for the six main instruments, while figure 7.6
shows the 14-day moving average time series of the daily GIS of the instruments.
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Table 7.5: Monthly shares of GIS for the main instruments
Month Spot Perpetual Futures
Binance Coinbase Binance Huobi OKEx* CME
Jun-20 16.62 % 16.16 % 18.46 % 28.28 % 12.44 % 8.05 %
Jul-20 20.62 % 12.07 % 22.17 % 17.13 % 11.29 % 16.72 %
Aug-20 16.64 % 10.40 % 18.04 % 23.74 % 14.56 % 16.62 %
Sep-20 15.91 % 14.73 % 20.57 % 15.82 % 16.22 % 16.75 %
Oct-20 13.60 % 15.44 % 19.57 % 1.74 % 22.57 % 27.08 %
Nov-20 4.19 % 14.02 % 13.44 % 22.63 % 31.19 % 14.52 %
Dec-20 8.42 % 22.22 % 23.42 % 12.79 % 21.83 % 11.32 %
Jan-21 7.66 % 12.05 % 14.59 % 28.89 % 24.22 % 12.58 %
Feb-21 3.31 % 18.31 % 16.60 % 22.21 % 27.60 % 11.97 %
Mar-21 3.97 % 17.17 % 22.22 % 26.98 % 21.87 % 7.80 %
Apr-21 1.98 % 7.04 % 19.76 % 13.84 % 18.72 % 38.66 %
Full sample 10.27 % 14.51 % 18.99 % 19.46 % 20.23 % 16.55 %
Note: This table shows the monthly GIS for the six main instruments from June 1, 2020, to April 30,
2021, adjusted for CME’s trading breaks. *The Q3 2020 contract on OKEx’s inverse bitcoin futures was
missing in the sample. In table 7.3 we found a high GIS on the linear OKEx futures during the first four
months of the sample. Thus, we have included OKEx’s linear futures from June 2020 to the end of
September 2020 before switching over to the inverse OKEx futures from October 2020 and onwards. This
might lead to a slight distortion of the GIS of OKEx, visible by the growing GIS of OKEx from October
2020 and onwards within the main instruments group.
Figure 7.6: GIS perpetuals: April, 2021 (14d MA)
Note: This figure shows the time series of the daily GIS of the six main instruments from June 1, 2020,
to April 30, 2021. The daily GIS is smoothed with a 14-day moving average. *The Q3 2020 contract on
OKEx’s inverse bitcoin futures was missing in the sample. In table 7.3 we found a high GIS on the linear
OKEx futures during the first four months of the sample. We have thus included OKEx’s linear futures
from June 2020 to the end of September 2020 before switching over to the inverse OKEx futures from
October 2020 and onwards.
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In contrast to the minor role of CME from April 2019 to January 2020, identified in
Alexander & Heck (2020), we find a more pronounced leadership role of CME in bitcoin’s
price discovery following the same methodology from June 2020 to April 2021.
Similar to the findings of Alexander & Heck (2020), we find that OKEx’s bitcoin futures
lead bitcoin’s price discovery, with Huobi’s futures following closely.
The GIS of the Huobi futures fluctuates between 14% and 28% with an outlier in October
of 2% due to low-quality data. In total, the Huobi futures leads in 4 out of the 11 months
analyzed.
The inverse bitcoin futures of OKEx account for between 18% to 31% of the monthly GIS
across all the main instruments. In contrast, the stablecoin-margined futures from the
first 4 months have a lower impact on the price discovery of bitcoin ranging between 11%
to 16%. In total OKEx lead in 2 of the 11 months analyzed in this sample.
The Binance perpetual also have an important role in bitcoin’s price discovery, leading
the market in 3 out of 11 months analyzed. Binance’s GIS is fairly stable month over
month, with the monthly GIS fluctuating between 13% and 23%.
While Binance stablecoin denominated spot pair dominated most months within the spot
market, the impact of Binance’s spot market is far less pronounced when extending our
price discovery model to account for additional instruments. In the first months of the time
series, Binance’s stablecoin spot pair had a pronounced role, contributing with 15-20%
of the GIS month by month in the first four months of the sample. Then, the Binance
stablecoin spot pairs fade into obscurity. Binance’s spot pair was the least important
contributor to the GIS in the full instrument sample from November and onwards, with a
GIS ranging between 8% to 2%.
On the other hand, the spot market on Coinbase seems to have a more important role
in the price discovery of bitcoin during the entire sample period, with its monthly GIS
ranging from 7% to 22%. Based on this, we believe that while Coinbase never led in terms
of price discovery, the spot market on Coinbase each month had a substantial contribution
to bitcoin’s price discovery.
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Intuitively these results makes sense. Activity in the Coinbase spot pair is in part driven by
new dollars entering the system, whereas the Binance USDT pair is based on stablecoins.
New buyers seeking to convert fiat currencies to bitcoin will go through one of the "fiat
gateways", such as Coinbase. Likewise, a large seller seeking to realize profits will sell
on fiat gateways. Investors buying or selling through stablecoins could be motivated
by other factors, such as collateralizing leveraged derivative trades or investing in other
cryptocurrencies. Investments coming from the outside of the system are intuitively more
likely to lead to price movements impacting the broad market than investments coming
from within.
The most significant observation from the full sample period is the growing importance of
CME’s regulated futures market. In Alexander and Heck’s article (2020), CME never saw
a monthly GIS surpassing 9% in the period from April 2019 till January 2020. However,
from June 2020 till April 2021, CME seems to have a far more substantial importance in
the market, with a GIS ranging from 7% at its lowest months to 39% at most. CME’s GIS
in April 2021 is the highest GIS measured in any of the instruments for the entire time
series within the main instrument analysis. This indicates that CME’s role in bitcoin’s
price discovery is growing. In the latter parts of April, the 14-day moving average GIS of
CME’s bitcoin futures reached 48%, indicating that the regulated bitcoin futures on CME
has become an important contributor to the price discovery of bitcoin. It is worth noting
that April 2021 was the first month since September 2020 where bitcoin saw negative
monthly returns. The high GIS of CME might suggest that trading activity on CME was
leading the trend shift in bitcoin, suggesting a possible declining interest from institutional
investors in bitcoin.
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8 Limitations and Further Research
In this section, we will briefly comment on the limitations of our thesis and recommend
further research on the topic of price discovery in bitcoin.
8.1 Limiations
The major limitation of our thesis is the quality of the datasets used. Several of the
instruments have large gaps of information. The most unfortunate gaps are found in the
FTX data. From Q1, 2021, and onwards, our findings suggest a growing leadership from
the FTX perpetual. However, we cannot firmly confirm whether this is a persisting trend
or if the high GIS from January and April were outlier events due to missing data. We
also had issues with rendering the full datasets from Binance’s spot market, Bitfinex,
OKEx’s inverse Q3 contract and temporal outages from Huobi. Albeit the research, in
general, is based on rich data, and we are comfortable with the validity of our results.
8.2 Further research
The bitcoin options market has blossomed the last year. On April 14, the options market
peaked with $15 billion worth of open interest in the options market, and the trading
volume of the options market has reached an ADV of $1 billion according to Skew.com.
With the growth of the bitcoin options market, it would be valuable to understand its
current influence on bitcoin’s price discovery.
We would also recommend involving LMAX Digital’s spot prices to further analyze the
price discovery in bitcoin. The exchange is a part of the LMAX Global cooperation and
is used by large accredited investors trading in the FX markets, and in 2021 has an ADV
above $1 billion. By adding LMAX Digital in the price discovery analysis, one may gain
a more nuanced understanding of the impact of institutional trading in bitcoin.
Further, as we are wrapping up this thesis, CME has launched a new futures contract
in bitcoin with a smaller contract size of 0.1 bitcoin. Over time, more investors might
move towards these smaller contracts as they allow for more flexible trades. Analyzing
the impact of the entrance of the new contracts within CME could be interesting.
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9 Conclusion
In this thesis, we examined the process of how new information is impounded into the
market, more commonly known as the price discovery process. We used GIS by Lien &
Shrestha (2014) and identified the most relevant and important markets in bitcoin’s price
discovery process. We analyzed the GIS within various markets using minute-by-minute
market close data from 21 different bitcoin pairs from June 1, 2020, until April 30, 2021.
First, we analyzed the GIS in the spot market by analyzing five spot pairs. The results
derived from this thesis suggest that Binance’s stablecoin denominated pair is leading the
spot market, with an average GIS of 31% throughout the sample period. Coinbase also
contributed substantially to the price discovery in the spot market with an average GIS
of 27% for the full sample period.
Second, we analyzed the GIS in the unregulated futures market by analyzing seven
futures instruments. Our results indicate that Huobi and OKEx futures are leading the
unregulated futures market with their instruments combined accounting for 52% of the GIS
for the full duration of the sample. In terms of GIS, OKEx’s inverse bitcoin futures was
on average the leading instrument from October to April, when this period was analyzed
separately due to missing data. Huobi and OKEx’s leading role was also discovered by
Alexander & Heck (2020) in their analysis. This indicates that these instruments have
maintained their position despite the massive developments in the bitcoin market structure
over the last year.
Third, we analyzed the GIS in the perpetuals market by analyzing eight perpetual
instruments. We found indications that Binance’s linear perpetual is the leading instrument
in the perpetuals market, with a GIS of 20%. Binance’s leadership was on par with what
one would expect, given their dominance in trading volume with an ADV of $7 billion for
the entire duration of the sample.
We then analyzed the main instruments in bitcoin’s price discovery process based on GIS.
They were selected based on their contribution within the aforementioned groups. We also
included the regulated bitcoin futures on CME in this last group, to identify the role of
the regulated markets in bitcoin’s price discovery. The results from this analysis suggest
that the unregulated futures on Huobi and OKEx tend to lead the market. Additionally,
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we observed trends of substantial price discovery taking place on both the CME futures
and the Binance perpetual, with CME seeing the largest monthly GIS recorded in any
instruments for the entire duration of the sample in April of 39%.
Through analyzing the main instruments, we identify that contrary to within the spot
market group, Binance’s stablecoin denominated spot pair primarily reacts to price
movements when compared to all the main instruments. Coinbase, on the other hand,
maintains a relatively high GIS when analyzed in the main instruments group. Intuitively
these results make sense. Coinbase’s spot pair is driven by new dollars entering the system,
whereas the Binance USDT pair is based on stablecoins. Investments coming from the
outside of the system are intuitively more likely to lead to price movements impacting the
broad market than investments coming from within.
This thesis further backs up the narrative of increased institutional adoption of bitcoin in
2020 due to the more pronounced leading role of CME’s bitcoin futures. Our observations
of the growing importance of CME could contribute to making a case for an ETF approval
from the SEC more likely. This would give retail investors a fair investment product
in bitcoin without fluctuating premiums and discounts. In our view, it would serve the
retail investors justice to approve an ETF in light of the growing presence of regulated
instruments in this trillion-dollar asset.
We also conclude that CME’s importance in the price discovery of bitcoin is more
pronounced now than it was from April 2019 till January 2020, when it was analyzed by
Alexander & Heck (2020).
The regulated futures market on CME is wagging bitcoin, "the honey badger of money".
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Appendix
A1 Johansen procedure for cointegration testing
Following are the full results for Johansen procedure for cointegration testing.
Table A1.1: Johansen-Procedure for cointegration testing of the spot market
10pct 5pct 1pct
r <= 4 4.80 10.49 12.25 16.26
r <= 3 3867.58 16.85 18.96 23.65
r <= 2 6210.08 23.11 25.54 30.34
r <= 1 54943.52 29.12 31.46 36.65
r <= 0 72899.06 34.74 37.52 42.39
Table A1.2: Johansen-Procedure for cointegration testing of the unregulated futures
market
10pct 5pct 1pct
r <= 6 4.58 10.49 12.25 16.26
r <= 5 47.22 16.85 18.96 23.65
r <= 4 280.08 23.11 25.54 30.34
r <= 3 436.52 29.12 31.46 36.65
r <= 2 768.24 34.75 37.52 42.36
r <= 1 978.00 40.91 43.97 49.51
r <= 0 1700.79 46.32 49.42 54.71
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Table A1.3: Johansen-Procedure for cointegration testing of the unregulated perpetuals
market
10pct 5pct 1pct
r <= 7 5.48 10.49 12.25 16.26
r <= 6 1624.80 16.85 18.96 23.65
r <= 5 5666.36 23.11 25.54 30.34
r <= 4 8983.42 29.12 31.46 36.65
r <= 3 12992.95 34.75 37.52 42.36
r <= 2 16928.18 40.91 43.97 49.51
r <= 1 29720.79 46.32 49.42 54.71
r <= 0 41510.62 52.16 55.50 62.46
Table A1.4: Johansen-Procedure for cointegration testing of leaders from different groups
and CME
10pct 5pct 1pct
r <= 5 6.70 10.49 12.25 16.26
r <= 4 178.29 16.85 18.96 23.65
r <= 3 330.06 23.11 25.54 30.34
r <= 2 1075.96 29.12 31.46 36.65
r <= 1 3530.74 34.75 37.52 42.36
r <= 0 20839.41 40.91 43.97 49.51
